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Abstract 
Despite continued popularity of participative budgeting, prior studies in this area resort to 
proprietary survey data, laboratory experimental evidence, or data from single firms with multi-
business units due to a lack of detailed information related to participative budgeting. Using a sample 
of 633 firm-year observations from S&P 1500 firms for fiscal years 2009 to 2011, I examine the 
relation between the use of participative budgeting and performance-to-goal. First, I find that the 
performance-to-goal of participative budgeting firms is higher than that of non-participative 
budgeting firms. Second, I investigate whether higher performance-to-goal is driven by motivational 
effects or slack building activities triggered by participative budgeting. I decompose performance-
to-goal into effort level and budgetary slack using analysts’ forecasts as the benchmark to show that 
motivational effects dominate and result in higher performance-to-goal for participative budgeting 
firms. Overall, this study reaffirms the continued popularity of participative budgeting in a budget-
setting process. 
Keywords: Participative budgeting; Motivational effect; Budgetary Slack. 
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Since a seminal work by Argyris [1952], participative budgeting, a process in 
which a manager is involved with and have influence on the determination of his or her 
budget (Shields and Shields [1998]), has been one of the heavily researched topics in 
managerial accounting area over the past a half century (Hofstede [1968], Brownell [1982a], 
Brownell and McInnes [1986], Brownell and Dunk [1991]). Accounting research 
documents that participative budgeting generally improves subordinates’ economic 
outcomes by providing superiors with some of their subordinates’ private information 
(Baiman and Evans [1983]). At the same time, another strand of literature on participative 
budgeting highlight that participation of subordinates may result in the generation of slack 
budgets (Dunk [1993]). 
This study examines the use of participative budgeting in S&P 1500 firms in 
executives’ annual bonus compensation. In particular, I address two questions related to 
the use of participative budgeting. First, I investigate whether firms that explicitly disclose 
their use of participative budgeting are more likely to show a higher level of performance 
goal achievement (p-to-g; defined as the ratio of actual performance relative to performance 
target). Second, I examine whether the increase in actual performance or the decrease in 
performance target has a stronger impact on the overall increase in performance-to-goal. 
While a few studies are unable to show a link between budgetary participation and 
performance (Brownell and McInnes [1986]), participative budgeting literature generally 
documents a positive relation between two variables. Subordinates participating in the 
budgeting process show higher levels of budget goal commitment (Argyris [1952], Locke, 
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Bryan, and Kendall [1968], Chong and Chong [2002a]) because they internalize goals 
(Hofstede [1968]) and increase their trust, sense of control, and ego-involvement with the 
organization (Shields and Shields [1998]). In addition, based on goal-setting theory, 
subordinates who are offered the opportunity to be involved with and have influence on 
budget goals are more likely to gather, exchange, and disseminate job-relevant information 
if they are highly committed to their budget goals (Locke and Latham [1990], Chong and 
Chong [2002a]) and thereby show a higher level of job performance relative to authoritative 
budgeting setting (Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan, and Young [2001], Tromp [2009]). 
On the other hand, budgetary participation is argued to leave room for slack 
budgets by subordinates. Slack is defined as the amount by which a subordinate overstates 
his or her needs for resources to complete a task or understates his or her productive 
capability (Walker and Johnson [1999]). The literature mainly proposes two variables 
whereby participative budgeting could affect slack building activities; the superiors’ budget 
emphasis and the information asymmetry between superiors and subordinates. It is 
assumed that budgetary participation with high (low) level of budget emphasis and high 
(low) information asymmetry generates high (low) budgetary slack (Dunk [1993]). 
Despite its theoretical appeal and long research history, these two conflicting 
literatures on participative budgeting have each developed on their own, leaving scant 
evidence on whether job performance enhancement overwhelms slack building activities 
or the other way around. One possible research method is to observe whether participative 
budgeting firms’ performance-to-goal is higher or lower. Assuming that participative 
budgeting firms have higher performance-to-goal, this could be achieved through higher 
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performance and/or lower performance targets (Anderson, Dekker, and Sedatole [2010]).  
In this light, Murphy [2001] points out that executives’ bonuses are usually not 
strictly based on a performance measure, but rather on performance measured relative to a 
performance target. Similarly, Indjejikian and Nanda [2002] document the relation between 
actual performance at the end of the fiscal year and target bonuses, which proxies firms’ ex 
ante incentive design decisions, to find implications on performance goal achievement. 
These studies suggest that research examining the impact on actual performance or 
performance targets alone constitutes an incomplete analysis.  
This study proposes a link between job performance enhancement and budgetary 
slack in participative budgeting setting by taking a look at EPS performance-to-goal of 
S&P 1500 firms in annual incentive plans. Following December 15, 2006, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandate that firms should disclose more information on 
executive compensation. Pertinent to this study, firms are required to disclose specific items 
of corporate performance measures, target levels, and actual performance. To my 
knowledge, this is the first archival study to examine the use of participative budgeting in 
a large-sample setting. The availability of new data source enables us to examine firms’ 
participative budgeting behavior in a large-sample setting. 
I gather information on whether or not firms’ budget-setting process takes a form 
of participative budgeting based on compensation discussion and analysis (CD&A) section 
of firms’ SEC proxy statements. To be specific, in setting performance goals, if firms’ 
compensation committee considers recommendation from CEO or management according 
to their proxy statements, then the firm is defined as a participative budgeting firm. If firms 
4 
 
do not explicitly disclose information on whether the compensation committee considers 
recommendations from CEO or management, then the firm is defined as a non-participative 
budgeting firm. 
To avoid measurement error and to facilitate comparison among firms, I restrict 
sample firms to those that use earnings per share (EPS) as one of their performance 
measures in annual incentive plans, since Kim and Yang [2010] document that EPS is the 
most widely used performance measure in annual incentive plans. Since most firms 
disclose the use of participative budgeting in the target-setting process as a whole, not the 
use of participative budgeting on each performance measure, I assume that if a firm 
discloses as a participative budgeting entity, participative budgeting is used in target-setting 
process for all performance measures. Thus, I believe the decision to use budgetary 
participation for one specific performance measure is not assumed to affect the use of 
budgetary participation for other performance measures. Overall, sample construction 
consisting solely of firms that use EPS as a performance measure does not seem to be 
affected by self-selection problems.  
My starting point is the findings of Anderson et al. [2010], who find that within a 
single firm that changes its compensation plan from a seniority-based plan to a pay-for-
performance plan in which the bonus-eligible managers participate in goal-setting, its 
performance-to-goal increases after adopting the new plan. Consistent with this perspective, 
I hypothesize that participative budgeting firms’ performance-to-goal in their annual bonus 
plans are significantly higher than that of non-participative budgeting firms. Taking 
advantage of a unique dataset that covers S&P 1500 firms that use EPS as one of their 
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performance measures in their annual bonus plans, I document that participative budgeting 
firms’ EPS performance-to-goal is higher. In particular, an indicator variable that captures 
whether or not a firm uses a participative budgeting in its annual executive bonus plan is 
still significantly positive after controlling for firm characteristic and CEO attribute 
variables.  
However, my explanation on why participative budgeting firms’ EPS 
performance-to-goal is higher differs from that of Anderson et al. [2010]. They argue that 
improved goal accuracy following the introduction of a goal-based bonus plan leads to 
higher performance-to-goal. Contrary to their expectations, I find no evidence on improved 
goal accuracy in a large-sample setting. To find out what determines the level of 
performance-to-goal, I decompose EPS performance-to-goal into two terms, effort level 
and budgetary slack, using analysts’ forecasts as a benchmark against which actual 
performance and performance targets are compared. I investigate the extent to which an 
indicator variable that captures participative budgeting affects effort level and target 
easiness and find that higher EPS performance-to-goal for participative budgeting firms is 
not driven by budgetary slack, but from increased effort level. 
My finding contributes to the literature in several ways. First, my study provides 
the first large-sample evidence of the effect of participative budgeting in the context of 
annual executive bonus plan using publicly available data. Prior studies base their findings 
on a survey-based field data among directors from a small group of firms. By using hand-
collected information, my study directly answers a call from Shields and Shields [1998] to 
“revise [participative budgeting’s] measurement” by offering the first large-sample 
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evidence on the impact of participative budgeting has on performance enhancement and 
slack building activities. 
Second, my study is the first to use one of the most widely used proxies for market 
expectations on firm performance, analysts’ forecasts, to measure a priori estimate of work 
performance in a participative budgeting setting. Prior studies use a survey item that 
directly asks subordinates to evaluate performance (budgets) relative to superiors’ 
expectations (their own best estimate of performance), casting doubt on the data reliability. 
By relying on “hard” data of analysts’ forecasts (Ittner and Larcker [2001]), my study 
avoids possible limitations of prior studies such as the leniency bias (Chenhall and 
Brownell [1988], Kren [1992]). 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. I develop my hypothesis in 
Section 2 and discuss my research design in Section3. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and Section 5 summarizes and concludes the study.  
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. RELATED LITERATURE 
Although budgets are often criticized by academics and practitioners, studies have 
shown that the vast majority of organizations use budgets (Sivabalan, Booth, Malmi, and 
Brown [2009]) as a key element of any firm’s organizational design with which information 
is communicated (Heinle, Ross, and Saouma [2014]). Over the past few decades, firms are 
increasingly involving their subordinates in the budgeting process, consistent with firm 
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hierarchies becoming flatter (Rajan and wulf [2006]).  
Among prior studies, most research on participative budgeting to date has been 
based on proprietary survey data (Young [1985], Nouri and Parker [1998]), data from 
single firms with multi-business units (Anderson et al. [2010]), theoretical modeling 
(Heinle et al. [2014]), and experimental results (Antle and Eppen [1985], Douthit and 
Stevens [2015]). For example, Brown, Evans, and Moser [2009] document that 
participative budgeting represents one of the most widely researched topics in experimental 
research in managerial accounting. However, an empirical study on participative budgeting 
has been rare due to data-availability issues, let alone in a large-dataset setting. Before the 
SEC’s 2006 disclosure requirements, firms were not required to disclose a detailed 
description of the process of setting performance targets and determining actual 
compensation levels based on evaluations against these targets (Gong, Li, and Shin [2011]). 
Thus, it has been almost impossible to conduct an empirical research in a large-dataset 
setting.  
Due to a lack of detailed information, participative budgeting literature has used a 
field-based survey item to proxy for pertinent variables. Almost all of the extant research 
has used Milani’s [1975] six-item scale (Shields and Shields [1998]) to measure 
participative budgeting, which attempts to assess the respondents’ involvement in and 
influence on the budget process (Brownell [1982a], Brownell [1985], Chenhall [1986], 
Chenhall and Brownell [1988], Nouri and Parker [1998], Chong and Chong [2002a]). A 
sample item in Milani’s [1975] instrument is: “The amount of influence that I have on the 
final budget”. If a respondent checks 1 out of 7, that means “very little” involvement in and 
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influence on the budget process; if he or she checks 7 out of 7, that means “very much” 
involvement in and influence on the budget process. In addition, Anderson et al. [2010] use 
an introduction of a pay-for-performance plan within a privately held specialty retailer in 
the United States to proxy for the use of participative budgeting, which limits the 
generalizability of their results.  
In addition, while previous studies highlight the importance of the use of ex ante 
benchmark against which actual performance or performance targets are compared, most 
studies depend on a self-rating survey item. In particular, in participative budgeting – 
performance relation literature, prior studies ask subordinates to evaluate their own actual 
performance relative to “superiors’ expectations” to capture effort level (Govindarajan and 
Gupta [1985], Nouri and Parker [1998]). Similarly, in participative budgeting – slack 
literature, researchers measure budgetary slack by asking subordinates to evaluate their 
own best estimate of work performance relative to the budget (Young [1985], Chow, 
Cooper, and Waller [1988], Waller [1988], Fisher, Frederickson, and Peffer [2002]), whose 
findings could be substantially affected from unreliable survey responses. 
Besides, the primary focus of participative budgeting studies has been on a variety 
of dependent variables that the use of participative budgeting affects, including 
performance (Brownell [1981], Brownell and Merchant [1990], Brownell and Dunk 
[1991]), job-related tension (Brownell and Hirst [1986], Harrison [1992], Lau, Low, and 
Eggleton [1995]), and budgetary slack (Onsi [1973], Dunk [1993]). However, participative 
budgeting literature has been relatively silent on the impact the use of participative 
budgeting has on performance-to-goal in bonus plans. “Performance-to-goal” is a critical 
9 
 
factor because bonus plans typically pay for actual performance relative to pre-established 
performance targets (Murphy [2001]).  
One exception is a work by Anderson et al. [2010], who investigate data from a 
single firm that changes its bonus plan from a seniority-based bonus plan, where 
subordinates’ cumulative prior-year bonuses are not at risk, to a pay-for-performance bonus 
plan including a participative budgeting scheme. They document that subordinates’ 
performance-to-goal increases after they adopt a new bonus plan because 1) increased 
monetary incentives of pay-for-performance plan leads to greater performance effort and 
2) subordinates in a participative budgeting setting exert effort toward both performance 
and downward goal negotiation. In other words, an increased performance-to-goal in their 
results is derived from both an introduction of a pay-for-performance plan and the use of 
participative budgeting. As pay-for-performance annual bonus plan is a widely used payout 
form for virtually every for-profit company (Kim and Shin [2015]), researchers need to 
distinguish the effects of the use of participative budgeting from increased monetary 
incentive effects due to an introduction of pay-for-performance bonus plan. This would 
reflect recent practice and generalize their results by examining the impact of adopting 
participative budgeting among firms that have already adopted pay-for-performance annual 
bonus plans. 
Anderson et al. [2010] argue that performance-to-goal, defined as store sales minus 
sales goal in their study, increases after implementation of the new plan because postplan 
goals are more accurate than preplan goals. In particular, they document that the mean of 
performance-to-goal in the postplan period is closer to zero (-0.08 versus -0.24) than in the 
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preplan period. However, one might argue that the increase of performance-to-goal from -
0.24 to -0.08 could also be interpreted as a mere increase of performance-to-goal due to an 
introduction of a pay-for-performance bonus plan including a participative budgeting 
scheme, not as getting closer to zero. In addition, their below-zero performance-to-goal 
imply that budgets are difficult to achieve. However, since firms allow achievable goals in 
practice for various reasons (Merchant and Manzoni [1989]), one could argue that 
Anderson et al. [2010]’s results may not represent an average firm.  
 
2.2. Research Question 
In spite of the importance of the performance-to-goal, the literature on participative 
budgeting has been relatively uninterested in the relation between the use of participative 
budgeting and performance-to-goal. Since Anderson et al. [2010] base their conclusions on 
data from a single firm where target difficulty is not descriptive of common practice, this 
study reexamines the impact of participative budgeting on performance-to-goal using a 
cross-sectionally diverse sample. Since subordinates have two mechanisms by which to 
increase performance-to-goal, namely effort toward performance and downward goal 
negotiation, I directly investigate which mechanism drives the difference in performance-
to-goal, if any, between participative budgeting firms and non-participative budgeting 
firms. I present the first hypothesis as follows. 
H1: Performance-to-goal is higher for participative budgeting firms than for non-
participative budgeting firms.  
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2.3. The First Mechanism: The Effect of participative budgeting use on Effort toward 
Performance 
Researchers have extensively examined whether the adoption of participative 
budgeting could ultimately increase firm performance. First, prior participative budgeting 
research documents motivation and cognitive mechanisms increasing job performance 
(Locke and Latham [1990], Kren [1992]). In particular, the participative mechanism 
motivates subordinates by instilling trust, a sense of control and ego-involvement. This 
leads to deeper acceptance and stronger commitment to budget decisions, and thus results 
in improved performance (Shields and Shields [1998], Anderson et al. [2010]). The 
cognitive mechanism highlights the improved quality of decisions as both superiors and 
subordinates are involved in a budget-setting process, in turn improving performance 
(Shields and Shields [1998]).    
Second, participative budgeting also promotes information exchange among 
participants in budget-setting process Subordinates’ budget proposals are generally known 
to reflect private information, such as market conditions (Baiman and Evans [1983], 
Murray [1990], Nouri and Parker [1998]). For example, Kren [1992] argue that 
subordinates’ private information, referred to as “job-relevant information” in his study, 
facilitates job-related decision making. Specifically, he argues that job-relevant 
information can improve performance because it allows more accurate predictions of 
environmental changes and thus allows more effective selection of appropriate responses. 
In similar vein, Campbell and Gingrich [1986] document that in their experiment, 
participation in setting goals facilitates discussions with another expert (the superior), 
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equipping subordinates with more insightful and effective approaches to complex projects. 
In this study, however, the compensation committee represents ‘superiors’ who 
may not have control over management decisions other than compensation-related matters. 
CEOs represent ‘subordinates’ at the other end of the process. Prior literature generally 
documents that for the “information exchange” role of participative budgeting to materially 
improve effort toward performance, superiors should benefit from subordinates’ private 
information derived from their budget proposals. In this regard, Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, 
and Moser [2001] document that to the extent that subordinates truthfully communicate 
their private information in the budget, participative budgeting yields useful information 
for central management to use in production, marketing, and capital budgeting decisions 
(Douthit and Stevens [2015]). Since this is the first study to empirically investigate the use 
of participative budgeting in the compensation committee – CEO settings, whether 
participative budgeting improves performance through promoting information exchange 
even when CEOs are subordinates are subject to empirical tests. 
Combining this motivational and cognitive mechanism and information exchange 
process, one could anticipate higher effort toward performance with participative budgeting. 
Specifically, I predict that if CEOs or executives are allowed to be involved with and have 
influence on targets, then they are more likely to commit to effort toward performance.  
H2a: CEOs or executives who participate in budget-setting process are more likely to 
commit to effort toward performance.  
   
2.4. The Second Mechanism: The Effect of participative budgeting use on Effort 
toward Downward Goal Negotiation 
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 While many studies on participative budgeting highlight its positive motivational 
and informational roles, agency analyses assume that absent of truth-inducing contracts to 
do otherwise, subordinates will misrepresent their private information and will build slack 
into their target to maximize compensation (Rankin, Schwartz, and Young [2008], Douthit 
and Stevens [2015]).  Young [1985] argues that a subordinate who has private information 
will build slack into the budget, emphasizing the importance of information asymmetry 
between subordinates and superiors. Baiman and Lewis [1989] argue that subordinates’ 
effort to create slack budgets is to enhance their compensation prospects. Specifically, if 
subordinates view their rewards are based on budget attainment (i.e., high budget emphasis), 
they may generate slack budgets in the first place. In this regard, Jensen [2001, 96] argues 
that participative budgeting “distorts incentives, motivating people to act in ways that run 
counter to the best interests of their companies.” 
Contrary to traditional agency theory, experimental studies on participative 
budgeting suggest that honesty concerns cause subordinates to sacrifice wealth to generate 
(at least partially) honest reports (Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser [2001]). Honesty 
is defined as the tendency of subordinates to avoid making untrue factual assertions despite 
pecuniary incentives (Evans et al. [2001], Rankin et al. [2008], Douthit and Stevens [2015]). 
This view is consistent with subjects experiencing disutility from lying because each 
individual has a personal honesty threshold (Baiman and Lewis [1989]). Taken together, 
recent research in managerial accounting document that subordinates’ opportunistic 
behavior would be lower than what is expected from economic theories (Krishnan, 
Marinich, and Shields [2012]). 
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Among experimental studies on honesty effects in participative budgeting settings, 
Rankin et al. [2008] document that less slack is created when budget communication 
requires a factual assertion from subordinates, but not when the superior has the final 
authority. In light of this paper’s setting, where the compensation committee generally has 
the final authority on whether to accept or reject budget recommendations from CEOs, 
CEOs’ honesty concerns would not have strong effects on their slack building activities. 
However, a recent study by Douthit and Stevens [2015] argue that even when the superior 
has rejection authority, honesty continues to have a strong effect on budgetary slack by 
giving the superior the ability to set the subordinate’s salary. Subordinates expect their 
superiors to pay above-market wages in exchange for above-minimal effort, described as 
“gift exchange” behavior in prior studies. Since the compensation committee generally has 
the final authority in CEO compensation decisions, one can expect that slack-building 
activities would be minimized.  
Economic and experimental studies on participative budgeting have differing 
views on subordinates’ budgetary slack. Even within the experimental field, the effect of 
honesty concerns vary according to situational factors. Therefore, I present a null form 
hypothesis as follows: 
H2b: CEOs or executives who participate in budget-setting process are not likely to 
create budgetary slack.  
   
3.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
3.1. The New SEC Disclosure Rules on Executive Compensation 
As of December 15, 2006, the SEC amended its regulation on executive 
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compensation to require more disclosure. Specifically, firms are required to disclose their 
performance measures and performance goals, along with their actual performance 
determined at the end of fiscal year. The new disclosure rules were designed to increase 
the transparency of executive compensation contracts, reflecting increased media and 
shareholder scrutiny of executive pay following practices on setting excessive pay (Gong 
et al. [2011]). 
By using performance goals and actual performance details in annual bonus plans 
disclosed in the “Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A)” section of proxy 
statements, I calculate the performance-to-goal measure as a ratio of the actual performance 
to the performance target. I hand-collected this information for sample firms for the 2009-
2011 period, which constitutes the sample period of this study.  
 
3.2. Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics 
I determine the use of participative budgeting in annual incentive plans by reading 
CD&A reports. In particular, I begin by reading a section named “role of chief executive 
officer” (the title of the section under which pertinent information is disclosed varies with 
firms, e.g., “role of management”) and identify participative budgeting firms as firms in 
which CEO or executives participate in the budget-setting process. Then, to ensure that the 
use of participative budgeting applies to setting performance targets for the annual bonus, 
not the other components of executive compensation (e.g., restricted stock, stock option), 
I check “annual incentive plans” to confirm that CEO or executives are involved in the 
target-setting process of the annual bonus plans.  
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To be conservative, I only classify a firm as a participative budgeting entity only 
if a firm explicitly discloses the use of participative budgeting. I observe two types of 
participative budgeting firms where targets could be either 1) determined based on board-
approved business plans (annual budgets) or 2) recommended by CEO or executives for 
evaluation purposes. In particular, firms using targets based on board-approved business 
plans share budgets, or at least use budgets of great similarity, for planning and 
performance evaluation purposes, whereas firms in which targets are recommended by 
CEO or executives use separate budgets for the conflicting planning and performance 
evaluation purposes. I define both types of firms as participative budgeting firms. Whether 
each type of participative budgeting firms differ in their behavior is left for future analysis. 
If a firm does not disclose the use of participative budgeting explicitly, or do not disclose 
explicitly who decides targets, then the firm is classified as a non-participative budgeting 
entity.  
Appendix A offers detailed coding criteria and representative proxy disclosures 
about participative budgeting in this study. I define AETNA INC NEW as a participative 
budgeting firm because its 2009 proxy statement articulates that the [compensation] 
committee establishes specific financial and operational goals at the beginning of each 
performance year “after consulting with the Board.” I regard the expression “after 
consulting with the Board” as evidence of participative budgeting. On the contrary, I 
classify SYMANTEC CORP as a non-participative budgeting entity because its proxy 
statement does not disclose the use of participative budgeting explicitly other than the 
information that “the compensation committee establishes specific 
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operating and/or financial performance goals.”  
Specifically, I take particular care not to confuse the concept of participation in 
setting the amount or form of compensation as participation in a target-setting process. 
According to CD&A reports, many firms generally stipulate that CEO or any executive is 
excluded from the decisions regarding his or her own compensation, reflecting media and 
shareholder concerns on excessive pay. Whether or not CEO or executives are allowed to 
recommend his or her own compensation to the compensation committee does not affect 
my judgment on whether a specific firm is a participative budgeting firm or not. I assume 
that firms have little reason to behave strategically in their disclosure of participative 
budgeting. Unlike the determination of compensation levels, investors would be less 
interested in the CEO or management involvement in setting budgets.   
I hand-collect the use of participative budgeting for annual bonus plans from S&P 
1500 companies’ annual proxy statements (DEF-14A) for fiscal year 2009 to 2011, which 
were identified as of fiscal year 2009. Panel A of Table 1 describes the sample selection 
process. With 4,500 possible firm year observations, 430 observations were deducted due 
to missing years. Out of 4,070 firm year observations, I restrict sample firm years to ones 
that use EPS as one of the performance measures in annual bonus plans. Because EPS 
targets and actual performance information are essential for calculating performance-to-
goal, firm year observations that lack EPS targets or actual performance data are also 
deducted. In addition, 33 firm year observations that use EPS growth measures and 82 firm 
year observations that lack firm characteristic and CEO attribute variables are excluded 
from the sample, along with the loss of 29 firm year observations due to IBES dataset merge. 
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My final sample consists of 633 firm year observations with available proxy statements.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents a breakdown of the firm year observations by year. This 
breakdown presents a relatively similar number of firm year observations each year, 
showing 29%, 34%, and 37% of the sample each year. Panel C of Table 1 reports that 386 
(about 61 percent) of the firm year observations use participative budgeting. 247 firm 
year observations (about 39 percent) are classified as a non-participative budgeting entity.  
 [Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN, SUMMARY STATISTICS, AND EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS 
4.1. Research Design 
In this section, I investigate the extent to which the use of participative budgeting 
affects my main dependent variable, performance-to-goal. To examine the impact of 
participative budgeting use on EPS performance-to-goal, we model EPS performance-to-
goal as a function of the use of participative budgeting after controlling for firm 
characteristics and CEO attributes influencing EPS performance-to-goal. The regression 
model is as follows: 
P-to-Gt = α0 + α1PBt + α2ln_Assett + α3Leveraget + α4BTMt + α5Ln_BIZSEGt + α6Return 
Volatilityt + α7Equity Comp Ratiot + α8CEO Aget + α9New CEOt + 
α10Ln_ceotenuret + Industry Effects + Year Effects + et               (1)                                                                                                         
 
In equation (1), the dependent variable, P-to-G, is defined as the ratio of EPS actual 
performance relative to EPS performance target set in the beginning of the fiscal year. My 
main test variable, PB, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm uses participative 
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budgeting, 0 otherwise. I include a firm’s total asset (ln_asset) to control for firm size, and 
the ratio of a firm’s total debt relative to total assets (Leverage) to proxy for a firm’s risk 
characteristics. To control for the possibility that high-growth firms are more likely to 
achieve their targets, I include book-to-market ratio (BTM). The complexity of business 
portfolio, Ln_BIZSEG, is included since achievability of performance targets is expected 
to increase steadily in that below-expectation performance in one business portfolio could 
be complemented with gains from performance in other business portfolios. Ln_BIZSEG is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the number of business segments. Stock return volatility 
(Return Volatility) is included to proxy for a noisier environment.  
The ratio of equity compensation to total compensation, Equity comp ratio, is 
included to control for the possibility that CEOs whose equity compensation is higher than 
that of other CEOs are less likely to care about achievability of performance targets in 
annual bonus plans. CEO age (CEO Age) and CEO tenure (Ln_ceotenure) variables are 
also included to examine whether experienced CEOs are more likely to achieve 
performance targets in annual bonus plans. Alternatively, CEO age and CEO tenure can 
also proxy for entrenched CEOs who are less likely to be dismissed for poor performance. 
An indicator variable that CEO is newly appointed during the year is included to examine 
the competence of newly appointed CEOs. Alternatively, newly appointed CEOs could also 
proxy for the fact that they are more likely to take a big bath during the year they start their 
new post.  
In what follows, I investigate the two mechanisms by which to increase 
performance-to-goal by decomposing performance-to-goal using analysts’ forecasts. 
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. The ratio of actual performance to benchmark 
measures effort level (EL), while the ratio of benchmark to performance target measures 
budgetary slack (BS). Here, I use analysts’ forecasts as benchmark since analysts’ forecasts 
represent market expectation at the time performance targets are set within the firm. If the 
ratio of actual performance to benchmark is higher for participative budgeting firms than 
for non-participative budgeting firms, this means CEO or executives in participative 
budgeting firms commit to more effort than those in non-participative budgeting firms, 
since higher ratio of actual performance to benchmark is interpreted as higher actual 
performance. If the ratio of benchmark to performance target is higher for participative 
budgeting firms than for non-participative budgeting firms, this means that CEO or 
executives in participative budgeting firms purposely create slack budgets to lower 
performance targets, which surface as a higher ratio of benchmark to performance targets.1 
                                           
1 As with my budgetary slack (BS) variable, Kim and yang [2010] measures a difference between 
EPS analysts’ forecasts and EPS performance targets by subtracting performance targets from 
analysts’ forecasts and finds that EPS performance targets are set lower than analysts’ forecasts on 
EPS performance. Yet, it could be problematic to directly compare between analysts’ forecasts and 
performance targets because analysts’ forecasts are generally known to be optimistically biased 
(O’Brien [1988], Brown [2001]). However, unlike Kim and Yang [2010], this study does not 
examine the direct relationship between analysts’ forecasts and performance targets. Therefore, the 
ratio of analysts’ forecasts to performance targets could differ between participative budgeting 
firms and non-participative budgeting firms even after considering the optimistic bias of analysts’ 
forecasts, assuming that the degree of bias does not differ considerably between participative 
budgeting firms and non-participative budgeting firms. Similarly, one might argue that analysts’ 
forecasts affect performance targets, as the compensation committee may refer to analysts’ 
forecasts when setting targets. Despite this possibility, the main focus on the dimension of 
participative budgeting remains valid. The ratio of analysts’ forecasts to performance targets may 
differ between participative budgeting firms and non-participative budgeting firms despite the 
possible bias. Once again, I assume that the extent to which analysts’ forecasts affect performance 
targets does not differ considerably between participative budgeting firms and non-participative 
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For my benchmark, I use the three-month average of prevailing analysts’ forecasts 
issued 10 to 8 months prior to fiscal year end. For example, if a firm’s fiscal year ends at 
December, the benchmark is calculated as the three-month average of prevailing analysts’ 
forecasts issued in February, March, and April during the year. For comparison, Kim and 
yang [2010] define analyst consensus as the three-month average of prevailing analysts’ 
forecasts in the first quarter (i.e., from January to March for a firm with fiscal year ending 
at December). The reason for this one-month difference from Kim and yang [2010] is that 
analysts’ forecasts are assumed to be more accurate if prior year performance information 
of a firm and its peers are considered, which is disclosed after two to three months 
following the prior year fiscal year end. As a result, I assume that analysts’ forecasts 
disclosed one month after prior year fiscal year end would be less likely to be accurate 
than those disclosed after two to three months following prior year fiscal year end. For 
robustness tests, I use different horizons to calculate analysts’ forecasts. Figure 1 provides 
an example of the horizons of analysts’ forecasts benchmark. The regression model is as 
follows: 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
EL(-10,-8)t = α0 + α1PBt + α2BS(-10,-8)t + α3ln_Assett + α4Leveraget + α5BTMt + 
α6Ln_BIZSEGt + α7Return Volatilityt + α8Equity Comp Ratiot + α9CEO 
Aget + α10New CEOt + α11Ln_ceotenuret + Industry Effects + Year Effects 
+ et                                                                                        (2)                                                                                                                                                  
 
BS(-10,-8)t = α0 + α1PBt + α2ln_Assett + α3Leveraget + α4BTMt + α5Ln_BIZSEGt + 
α6Return Volatilityt + α7Equity Comp Ratiot + α8CEO Aget + α9New CEOt + 
α10Ln_ceotenuret + Industry Effects + Year Effects + et           (3) 
                                                                                                        
                                           




In equation (2) and (3), the dependent variable EL(-10,-8) and BS(-10,-8) use 
benchmark defined as the three-month average of prevailing analysts’ EPS forecasts issued 
10 to 8 months prior to fiscal year end. Equation (2) and (3) use the same control variables 
as in Equation (1), except that the budgetary slack variable, BS(-10,-8), is controlled in 
Equation (2). One should note that higher budgetary slack represents easier targets to 
achieve. A large stream of goal-setting theory maintains that presence of targets and their 
difficulty strongly influence effort (Locke and Latham [2002]). Indjejikian, Matějka, 
Merchant, and Van der Stede [2014b] also argue that managerial choice of effort is a 
function of expected compensation that is driven by the likelihood of achieving a 
performance target. In addition, a recent experimental research shows that individuals with 
challenging targets and/or performance-based pay have higher productivity per production 
efficiency (Webb, Williamson, and Zhang [2013]). To examine whether the use of 
participative budgeting still has a significant impact on effort level after controlling for 
target difficulty, I control for budgetary slack in Equation (2), since budgetary slack 
determined at the beginning of the year is assumed to affect effort level during the rest of 
the fiscal year.  
 
4.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on firm characteristics and CEO attributes 
for the sample firms. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. 
See Appendix B for the variable definitions. Panel A in Table 2 presents summary statistics 
on actual performance, targets, and benchmark. The mean EPS actual performance is 
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$2.589, $2.463 for the mean EPS targets, and $2.340 for the mean analysts’ forecasts. This 
is descriptive of a performance-to-goal above 1, suggesting that firms are more likely to 
achieve their targets. This result is consistent with Merchant and Manzoni [1989] that 
managers are given easy targets for various reasons.  
As shown, firms that disclose the use of participative budgeting in annual bonus 
plans differ from non-participative budgeting firms along many dimensions. Most 
importantly, the mean and median EPS performance-to-goal of participative budgeting 
firms are significantly higher than of non-participative budgeting firms (1.114 versus 1.040 
for mean, 1.059 versus 1.031 for median), suggesting a simple result on the test for 
hypothesis 1 that performance-to-goal for participative budgeting firms is higher than for 
non-participative budgeting firms. In addition, effort level metric, EL(-10,-8), is 
significantly higher for participative budgeting firms, while budgetary slack metric, BS(-
10,-8), for participative budgeting firms does not differ from that for non-participative 
budgeting firms. This is suggestive of an interpretation that higher effort level results in 
higher EPS performance-to-goal for participative budgeting firms, not the effect of 
budgetary slack.  
Beside performance-to-goal, effort level, and budgetary slack variables, participati
ve budgeting firms are more likely to be small and use more debt. In addition, CEOs
 in participative budgeting firms are offered a smaller equity-based compensation co
mpared to those in non-participative budgeting firms. I delve into the differences of 
P-to-G related variables, firm characteristics, and CEO attributes between participativ
e budgeting firms and non-participative budgeting firms by looking at regression resu
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lts next section.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
4.3. Empirical Results 
Table 4 presents results from the estimation of Equation (1), (2), and (3) using P-
to-G, EL(-10,-8), BS(-10,-8) as dependent variables, respectively. In column (1), the 
dependent variable is P-to-G, and the key explanatory variable, PB, is significantly positive 
after controlling after firm characteristics and CEO attributes. This suggests that 
participative budgeting firms’ EPS performance-to-goal is significantly larger than that of 
non-participative budgeting firms. This result is consistent with Anderson et al. [2010]. The 
coefficient on Equity Comp Ratio is significantly negative, suggesting that CEOs whose 
equity compensation is higher than that of other CEOs shows lower EPS performance-to-
goal in their annual bonus plans. In addition, the coefficient on Leverage is negatively 
associated, albeit marginally, with EPS performance-to-goal, suggesting that risky firms 
are less likely to achieve their EPS performance-to-goal.  
In column (2), the dependent variable is EL(-10,-8), and consistent with H2(a), the 
coefficient on PB is significantly positive. This suggests that CEOs of participative 
budgeting firms show a greater deal of effort compared to those of non-participative 
budgeting firms. In addition, the coefficient on BS(-10,-8) is significantly negative, 
consistent with challenging targets motivating CEOs to have positively impact on their 
effort level. This result empirically confirms goal-setting theory that the presence of targets 
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and their difficulty strongly affects effort (Locke and Latham [2002]). The coefficient on 
Leverage is significantly negative, suggesting that risky firms are less likely to show higher 
level of actual performance. Consistent with the prediction, CEOs whose equity 
compensation is higher shows lower, albeit marginal, effort level.  
In column (3), the dependent variable is BS(-10,-8), and my key explanatory 
variable, PB, is not significant. This suggests that CEOs who are allowed to be involved 
with and have influence on performance targets are not likely to engage in slack-building 
activities, consistent with H2b in a null form. This result reaffirms the continued popularity 
of participative budgeting as an organizational control tool in that the use of participative 
budgeting is highly motivational, yet has little impact on CEOs’ rent extraction activities, 
such as budgetary slack (Shields and Shields [1998], Libby and Lindsay [2010], Douthit 
and Stevens [2015]).  
I additionally conduct test for whether an increase in performance-to-goal of 
participative budgeting firms is driven by increased goal accuracy, as suggested by 
Anderson et al. [2010]. The mean of performance-to-goal approaching zero and decreased 
standard deviation of performance-to-goal following the adoption of a new pay-for-
performance bonus plan in participative budgeting setting is suggested as evidence of 
increased goal accuracy. I redefine performance-to-goal as actual EPS performance minus 
EPS target. In an untabulated analysis, actual EPS performance is 16 cents higher than the 
EPS performance target for participative budgeting firms, whereas actual EPS 
performance is 10 cents higher than the EPS target for non-participative budgeting firms. 
This result runs against Anderson et al. [2010] who argue that the mean of performance-
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to-goal, defined as actual performance minus target in their study, gets closer to zero. 
This paper’s results suggest that the mean of actual performance minus target is farther 
from zero for participative budgeting firms than for non-participative budgeting firms. In 
addition, I examine whether the standard deviation of performance-to-goal for 
participative budgeting firms is significantly lower. In an untabulated analysis, the 
standard deviation of my newly defined performance-to-goal, actual EPS performance 
minus EPS target, is lower for participative budgeting firms than that for non-
participative budgeting firms (0.516 versus 0.567), but Levene’s test of equality of 
variance reports that the result is not significant (p-value: 0.1712). Taken together, my 
result differs from Anderson et al. [2010] who suggest that the goal accuracy for 
participative budgeting firms is higher than that for their counterparts. Instead, I argue 
that increased effort level drives an increase in performance-to-goal for participative 
budgeting firms.   
 [Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
4.4. Robustness Tests 
Table 5 presents robustness tests for the results of Table 4. I use different benchmark 
horizons to calculate effort level and budgetary slack variables as the dependent variables. 
Specifically, EL(-11,-9) and BS(-11,-9) are calculated by defining the benchmark as the 
three-month average of prevailing analysts’ EPS forecasts issued 11 to 9 months prior to 
fiscal year end, consistent with Kim and yang [2010] who define analyst consensus as the 
average of prevailing analysts’ forecasts issued in the first quarter of the year. Similarly, 
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EL(-13,-8) and BS(-13,-8) (EL(-14,-9) and BS(-14,-9))  use benchmarks defined as the 
six-month average of prevailing analysts’ EPS forecasts issued 13 to 8 (14 to 9) months 
prior to fiscal year end. From column (1) to column (6), the results are generally 
consistent with the results of Table (4). The coefficient on PB is significantly positive in 
column (1), (3), and (5), while the coefficient on PB is not significant in column (2), (4), 
and (6). In addition, the coefficient on budgetary slack is significantly negative on effort 
level regressions except column (6) that uses EL(-14,-9) as a dependent variable. Taken 
together, my robustness tests generally confirms the findings of Table 4.  
 [Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Despite the continued popularity of participative budgeting, the literature on 
participative budgeting has been silent on empirical studies. The lack of information on the 
use of participative budgeting has forced prior studies to depend on proprietary survey data, 
laboratory experimental evidence, or data from single firms with multi-business units.  
I provide the first large-sample evidence on the use of participative budgeting and 
its relation with performance-to-goal based on S&P 1500 firms’ proxy statements. Using a 
subset of S&P 1500 firms that use EPS as one of the performance measures in annual bonus 
plans, I demonstrate that EPS performance-to-goal is higher for participative budgeting 
firms than for non-participative budgeting firms. Next, I examine whether higher 
performance-to-goal is driven by motivational effects or slack building activities triggered 
by the use of participative budgeting. I find that higher EPS performance-to-goal is driven 
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by improved effort level, and that EPS targets are not made lower by the use of participative 
budgeting, suggesting that CEOs’ slack building activities are not pervasive in the 
compensation committee – CEO settings.  
One limitation of my analyses is that I am unable to identify firms that use 
participative budgeting implicitly without disclosing such information. The quality of the 
disclosed information on participative budgeting vary significantly across firms. This study 
serves as the first step to understand participative budgeting and its effects on incentive 
plans, thus, there is much room for us to expand to other related issues on target-setting 













APPENDIX A: CODING CRITERIA AND EXAMPLES OF DISCLOSURES ABOUT 
PARTICIPATIVE BUDGETING 
 
Example of Participative Budgeting Firms 
 
1) Targets determined based on board-approved business plans (annual budgets) 
 
- Excerpt from Sherwin Williams CO’s 2011 proxy statement 
 
Role of Management 
 
With regard to executive compensation, management generally makes recommendations to 
the Compensation Committee and plays a more active role in the compensation process. 
Management makes recommendations relating to the development of compensation plans and 
programs and changes to existing plans and programs. Management also makes recommendations 
with respect to the evaluation of executive performance, salary increases, the performance goals 
and weightings for annual cash incentive compensation, the financial performance goals for 
grants of restricted stock, the results attained with respect to performance goals, and the number of 
stock options and shares of restricted stock granted. 
 
Annual Cash Incentive Compensation 
 
Annual Performance Goals. For 2011, the Compensation Committee reviewed our annual 
operating budget and approved target financial performance goals that were set at levels that 
were of the same magnitude as set forth in our 2011 annual operating budget. Financial 
performance goals also reflect pro-forma projections related to our acquisition of Leighs Paints in 
July 2011. We set challenging performance goals – the target levels for most of the 2011 financial 
performance goals were set at levels that showed improvement over 2010 actual results. Maximum 
levels of performance goals are intended to require significant effort to reach. 
 
2) Targets recommended by CEO or executives for evaluation purposes 
 
- Excerpt from AETNA INC NEW’s 2009 proxy statement 
 
How are annual performance-based bonuses determined? 
 
Annual bonuses are paid in cash. All executive officers and managers are eligible to 
participate in the Annual Bonus Plan (“ABP”). The Committee, after consulting with the 
Board, establishes specific financial and operational goals at the beginning of each 
performance year, and annual bonus funding is linked directly to the achievement of these 
annual goals. Following the completion of the performance year, the Committee assesses 
performance against the pre-established performance goals to determine bonus funding for the year. 
The ABP goals, described in more detail below, are directly derived from our strategic and business 
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operating plan approved by the Board. These goals, which measure annual results, require 
performance to be balanced between delivering financial results and achieving internal and external 
constituent goals. The Company believes it is important to consider these non-financial constituent 
goals, which have a 20% ABP weighting, because they help keep a focus on our longer-term success 
and the quality of our brand and reputation, rather than strict annual financial results. 
 
Example of Non-Participative Budgeting Firms 
 
1) Targets determined by the compensation committee 
 
- Excerpt from SYMANTEC CORP’s 2010 proxy statement 
 
Semi-Annual Incentive Compensation 
 
Performance Goal and Achievement Levels. Shortly after the start of each semi-annual 
performance period, the Compensation Committee establishes specific 
operating and/or financial performance goals to correspond to specific ICP achievement levels 
ranging between 0% and 200% of the target bonus opportunity for executive officers. For both 
the first half and second half of fiscal 2010, the Compensation Committee selected earnings per 
share as the financial measure for the ICP. For fiscal 2010, earnings per share was calculated 
under generally accepted accounting principles. The Compensation Committee selected earnings 
per share as the appropriate performance goal for the fiscal 2010 ICP because it believed 
earnings per share closely reflects our overall performance and profitability and the returns 
achieved by our stockholders. The Compensation Committee believes that the ICP assists in 
achieving our compensation objectives of motivating executives to improve our overall performance 
and profitability and tying incentive awards to financial metrics that drive the performance of our 
common stock over the long term. 
 
2) No reference on whom decides targets 
 
- Excerpt from PRECISION CASTPARTS CORP’s 2011 proxy statement 
 
Base Salaries, Annual Performance-Based Cash Bonuses and Stock Options 
 
Performance-Based Cash Bonuses. The Company utilizes annual performance-based 
cash bonuses to motivate and reward executive officers for the achievement of Company or 
operating unit annual performance targets. The performance criteria applicable to each NEO differ 
based on the portion of the Company’s operations for which the NEO is responsible. Target bonus 
levels as a percentage of base salary are pre-determined based on NEOs’ positions with the 
Company. No bonus is payable under any of the Company’s bonus plans if the performance result 
is less than 80% of targeted performance, and the maximum bonus payout is 250% of an 
individual’s target bonus. All performance criteria under the Company’s bonus plans are adjusted 
to eliminate the effects of acquisitions not included in the fiscal year budget, accounting changes, 
the difference between planned and actual currency exchange rates, and restructuring and asset 







P-to-G = ratio of EPS actual performance relative to EPS performance target set in the beginning of 
the year; 
EL(-10,-8) = ratio of EPS actual performance relative to the three-month average of prevailing analysts’ 
EPS forecasts issued 10 to 8 months prior to fiscal year end; 
EL(-11,-9) = ratio of EPS actual performance relative to the three-month average of prevailing analysts’ 
EPS forecasts issued 11 to 9 months prior to fiscal year end; 
EL(-13,-8) = ratio of EPS actual performance relative to the six-month average of prevailing analysts’ 
EPS forecasts issued 13 to 8 months prior to fiscal year end; 
EL(-14,-9) = ratio of EPS actual performance relative to the six-month average of prevailing analysts’ 
EPS forecasts issued 14 to 9 months prior to fiscal year end; 
BS(-10,-8) = ratio of the three-month average of prevailing analysts’ EPS forecasts issued 10 to 8 months 
prior to fiscal year end relative to EPS performance target set in the beginning of the year; 
BS(-11,-9) = ratio of the three-month average of prevailing analysts’ EPS forecasts issued 11 to 9 months 
prior to fiscal year end relative to EPS performance target set in the beginning of the year; 
BS(-13,-8) = ratio of the six-month average of prevailing analysts’ EPS forecasts issued 13 to 8 months 
prior to fiscal year end relative to EPS performance target set in the beginning of the year; 
BS(-14,-9) = ratio of the six-month average of prevailing analysts’ EPS forecasts issued 14 to 9 months 
prior to fiscal year end relative to EPS performance target set in the beginning of the year; 
PB = 1 if a firm discloses the use of participative budgeting, 0 otherwise; 
Ln_asset = natural logarithm of total assets; 
Leverage = total debt divided by total assets; 
BTM = book-to-market ratio at fiscal-year-end; 
Ln_BIZSEG = natural logarithm of the number of business segments; 
Return Volatility = standard deviation of monthly compounded annual stock returns (Return) over five years 
(t-5 to t-1); 
Equity Comp 
Ratio = 
ratio of long-term variable pay to total compensation; 
CEO Age = 1 if CEO age is over 65, 0 otherwise; 
New CEO = dummy variable indicating change in CEO during the year; 
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FIGURE 1: The Horizons of Analysts’ Forecasts Benchmark used in Effort Level and 


















TABLE 1: Sample selection and Participative Budgeting Use by Type 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
S&P1500 Firm years  4,500 
  Less firm years with missing years (430) 
  Less firm years that do not use EPS as one of the performance measures  or t
hat lack EPS target/Actual information 
(3,293) 
Less firm years using EPS growth measures (33) 
Less firm years that lack firm characteristic and CEO attribute variables (82) 
Less firm years with missing variables due to IBES dataset merge (29) 
Final sample firm-years  633 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by year 
Year    Frequency   Percent 
2009    184   29% 
2010    217   34% 
2011    232   37% 
Total firm-years    633   100% 
 
Panel C: Participative Budgeting Use by Type 
Year   Number of Firm-years   Percent 
Participative Budgeting Firms   386   60.98% 
Targets determined based on board-approved bu
siness plans(annual budgets) 
  205   32.39% 
    Targets recommended by CEO or executives for
 evaluation purposes 
  181   28.59% 
Non-Participative Budgeting Firms  247  39.02% 
Targets determined by the Compensation 
Committee, consultants, or others 
 209  33.02% 
No reference on whom decides targets  38  6.00% 








TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
Measure N Mean Stdev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
 EPS_actual 633 2.589 1.620 0.210 1.430 2.270 3.390 8.390 
 EPS_target 633 2.463 1.499 0.250 1.370 2.200 3.150 7.520 
 EPS_benchmark 633 2.340 1.572 -0.173 1.240 2.050 3.037 8.133 
 PB 633 0.610 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  P-to-G 633 1.085 0.299 0.314 0.982 1.046 1.151 2.636 
  EL(-10,-8) 633 1.151 0.835 -3.387 0.966 1.048 1.199 4.579 
  BS(-10,-8) 633 0.990 0.417 -0.092 0.918 1.000 1.043 3.231 
  Ln_asset 633 8.406 1.527 5.505 7.244 8.464 9.391 12.334 
  Leverage 633 0.560 0.178 0.133 0.434 0.562 0.689 1.003 
  BTM 633 0.522 0.286 0.000 0.323 0.479 0.685 1.401 








633 0.494 0.207 0.000 0.390 0.530 0.639 0.852 
 CEO Age 633 0.087 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 New CEO 633 0.073 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 















(n = 386) 
Non-PB firms 
(n = 247) 
  





P-to-G metrics             
  P-to-G 1.114 1.059 1.040 1.031 0.074*** 0.028*** 
 Effort Level(EL) metrics       
 EL(-10,-8) 1.228 1.061 1.029 1.030 0.199*** 0.031** 
 
Target Easiness(TE)  
metrics 
      
 BS(-10,-8) 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.003 -0.017 -0.003 
 Firm Characteristics       
 Ln_asset 8.282 8.371 8.600 8.561 -0.318** -0.190 
 Leverage 0.566 0.590 0.549 0.524 0.017 0.066*** 
 BTM 0.528 0.486 0.511 0.463 0.017 0.023 
 Ln_BIZSEG 1.490 1.609 1.477 1.609 0.013 0.000* 
 Return Volatility 0.095 0.092 0.095 0.091 0.000 0.001 
 CEO Attributes       
 Equity Comp Ratio 0.476 0.519 0.522 0.540 -0.046*** -0.021 
 CEO Age 0.093 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.016 0.000 
 New CEO 0.067 0.000 0.081 0.000 -0.014 0.000 










Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1)PB 1.00             
(2)P-to-G 0.12*** 1.00            
(3)EL(-10,-8) 0.12*** 0.26*** 1.00           
(4)BS(-10,-8) -0.02 0.16*** -0.17*** 1.00          
(5)Ln_asset -0.10** -0.07* -0.13*** 0.08** 1.00         
(6)Leverage 0.05 -0.10** -0.08** 0.00 0.37*** 1.00        
(7)BTM 0.03 0.03 -0.15*** 0.07* 0.12*** -0.08** 1.00       
(8)Ln_BIZSEG 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.32*** 0.20*** 0.06 1.00      
(9)Return Volatility 0.00 0.16*** 0.00 -0.08** -0.46*** -0.23*** 0.16*** -0.27*** 1.00     
(10)Equity Comp Ratio -0.11*** -0.18*** -0.10** 0.02 0.31*** 0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.15*** 1.00    
(11)CEO Age 0.03 -0.01 -0.08** -0.07* -0.07* -0.09** 0.08* 0.02 0.08** -0.13*** 1.00   
(12)New CEO -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.09** 0.03 0.12*** 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 1.00  
(13)Ln_ceotenure 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.08** -0.03 0.04 -0.11*** 0.32*** -0.53*** 1.00 
 
The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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TABLE 4: Regression of Participative Budgeting Use in Annual Bonus Plans  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES P-to-G EL(-10,-8) BS(-10,-8) 
PB 0.050** 0.175*** -0.051 
 (2.22) (2.93) (-0.87) 
BS(-10,-8)  -0.585***  
  (-3.65)  
Ln_asset 0.012 0.017 0.023 
 (1.02) (0.61) (1.46) 
Leverage -0.192* -0.656*** -0.165 
 (-1.89) (-2.62) (-0.88) 
BTM -0.034 -0.104 0.158* 
 (-0.70) (-0.78) (1.66) 
Ln_BIZSEG 0.005 0.035 -0.022 
 (0.20) (0.54) (-0.55) 
Return Volatility 1.170* 1.506 -0.863 
 (1.91) (0.90) (-0.94) 
Equity Comp Ratio -0.284*** -0.291* 0.004 
 (-3.87) (-1.67) (0.03) 
CEO Age -0.067 -0.090 -0.015 
 (-1.64) (-0.77) (-0.27) 
New CEO 0.012 0.023 0.008 
 (0.23) (0.20) (0.08) 
Ln_ceotenure -0.012 -0.077 -0.013 
 (-0.45) (-1.09) (-0.30) 
Industry and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.063*** 1.752*** 0.981*** 
 (8.50) (4.67) (5.01) 
Observations 633 633 633 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.350 0.114 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 








TABLE 5: Regressions of Effort Level and Budgetary Slack on Participative Budgeting Use 
using Various Benchmark Horizons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES EL(-11,-9) BS(-11,-9) EL(-13,-8) BS(-13,-8) EL(-14,-9) BS(-14,-9) 
PB 0.124* -0.056 0.118* -0.053 0.327** -0.056 
 (1.70) (-0.77) (1.68) (-0.73) (1.97) (-0.74) 
BS(-11,-9) -0.659***      
 (-2.87)      
BS(-13,-8)   -0.489**    
   (-2.04)    
BS(-14,-9)     -0.445  
     (-1.33)  
Ln_asset -0.045 0.017 0.020 0.013 -0.053 0.009 
 (-0.80) (0.89) (0.30) (0.72) (-0.76) (0.48) 
Leverage -0.503* -0.006 -0.626** -0.013 0.682 -0.012 
 (-1.89) (-0.03) (-2.16) (-0.06) (0.91) (-0.06) 
BTM -0.428** 0.234** -0.683* 0.246** 0.350 0.271** 
 (-2.03) (2.05) (-1.82) (2.19) (0.81) (2.36) 
Ln_BIZSEG 0.028 -0.039 0.037 -0.032 0.025 -0.023 
 (0.37) (-0.86) (0.46) (-0.72) (0.25) (-0.49) 
Return Volatility 5.562* -1.323 9.697 -1.413 8.071 -1.546 
 (1.86) (-1.19) (1.44) (-1.27) (0.95) (-1.33) 
Equity Comp Ratio 0.275 -0.060 0.089 -0.070 -0.452 -0.091 
 (0.77) (-0.37) (0.35) (-0.44) (-1.14) (-0.56) 
CEO Age -0.044 -0.017 -0.041 -0.017 -0.084 -0.024 
 (-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.18) (-0.36) 
New CEO 0.036 -0.014 0.039 -0.015 -0.189 -0.005 
 (0.14) (-0.13) (0.21) (-0.14) (-0.70) (-0.05) 
Ln_ceotenure -0.127 0.011 -0.075 0.007 -0.091 0.003 
 (-1.00) (0.21) (-0.63) (0.14) (-0.67) (0.06) 
Industry and Year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.781*** 1.032*** 0.765 1.082*** -3.928* 1.163*** 
 (3.07) (4.71) (0.58) (4.87) (-1.91) (2.94) 
Observations 633 633 633 633 631 631 
Adjusted R-squared 0.720 0.136 0.677 0.153 0.426 0.171 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 





참여적 예산설정이 성과목표 
달성수준에 미치는 영향 
 
 
지속적인 중요성에도 불구하고, 참여적 예산설정과 관련된 선행연구는 상세 
자료 미비에 따라 설문 조사 자료, 실험연구 및 복수의 사업 부문을 가진 단
일 회사 자료에 의존해왔다. 본 연구는 2009년부터 2011년까지 S&P 1500
대 기업에서 추출한 633개의 기업-연도 관측치를 이용하여 참여적 예산설정
이 성과목표 달성수준에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 첫째, 참여적 예산설정을 
시행하는 기업의 성과목표 달성수준이 참여적 예산설정을 시행하지 않는 기업
의 성과목표 달성수준보다 높다. 둘째, 높은 성과목표 달성수준이 참여적 예
산설정으로부터 야기된 동기부여 효과 때문인지 또는 슬랙 창출 행동 때문인
지를 분석하였다. 이를 위해 재무분석가 예측치를 기준치로 사용하여 성과목
표 달성수준을 노력 수준과 예산 슬랙으로 분해하였으며, 그 결과 참여적 예
산설정을 시행하는 기업의 높은 성과목표 달성수준은 동기부여 효과로부터 야
기되었음이 드러났다. 결론적으로, 본 연구는 예산 설정 과정에서 참여적 예
산설정의 지속적인 중요성을 재검증하였다. 
 
주요어 : 참여적 예산설정, 동기부여 효과, 예산 슬랙  
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